Appellate Court remands for Krankel hearing where defendant makes ineffective assistance claims to Probation during PSI interview

The appellant in People v. Downing, 2019 IL App (1st) 170329 appealed the trial court’s decision denying a request made by the State for a Krankel inquiry into alleged ineffective assistance of Downing’s trial counsel. The First District held that, despite an initial answer to the contrary, a Krankel inquiry was necessitated in this case, reversing the judgment of the circuit court, and remanding for Krankel proceedings. Id. at ¶ 4.

Downing was found guilty of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. During his pre-sentence investigation interview, Downing complained of his trial counsel’s performance, which complaints were evidenced in the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). These complaints included allegations that counsel requested to call three witnesses at trial, who were never called; requested new counsel, which was never provided; was denied a request testify on his own behalf; allowed the police to make false statements at trial; failed to raise issues regarding the arresting officers’ failure to read him his Miranda rights; and failed to challenge inaccuracies in the police report. Id at ¶ 10.

At sentencing, the State argued in aggravation that the complaints detailed in the PSI were evidence of Downing’s lack of remorse. Id. at ¶ 11. However, neither at sentencing nor in any other communication with the court did Downing repeat his complaints about his counsel. Downing was subsequently sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Id. at ¶ 12. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Downing argued that the trial court was required to conduct a Krankel inquiry into the allegations of attorney incompetence expressed to the probation department during his PSI interview. Id. at ¶ 15. At the outset, the court acknowledged “there is no dispute that at least some of these allegations sufficed, in terms of their content, to raise a pro se post-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 17. However, the court noted its decision ought not be predicated on the content of the claims, but the manner in which they were received by the trial court, and by whom they were delivered. Id. at ¶ 18. As a result, the court held that the question they must evaluate was whether allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, attributed to the defendant but presented to the trial court in open court by someone other than the defendant, require the court to conduct a Krankel inquiry. Id. at ¶ 18.

The court held that it should not make “a difference that the issue [of ineffective assistance of counsel] was raised by the State.” Id. at ¶ 21. As a result, the court concluded that it was a logical extension of existing precedent (Jackson) to hold that, because the State emphasized in open court that defendant had complained about his trial representation and specifically directed the trial court to the page of the PSI in which those complaints appeared, the trial court had a duty under Krankel to conduct an inquiry into the substance of these claims. Id. at ¶ 22. The court further held that more recent case law (Harris) supported such a holding in this case. Id. at ¶ 23.

As a result, the First District remanded this case to the trial court for a preliminary Krankel inquiry, which is designed to determine whether defendant wishes to pursue his allegations in a Krankel proceeding. Id. at ¶ 71. In the event defendant wishes to pursue them, the trial court is instructed to determine whether the allegations reveal possible neglect of the case by counsel. Id. at ¶ 72.

Illinois Supreme Court declines to extend Krankel hearings to post-conviction cases

The petitioner in People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, requested the Illinois Supreme Court to extend procedures and protections established in People v. Krankel to claims of unreasonable assistance by post-conviction counsel in proceedings under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined the invitation to expand its application of Krankel.

Custer was initially charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Custer entered an open guilty plea to the charge. Prior to sentencing, petitioner was arrested again and charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, aggravated assault, unlawful use of a weapon, and aggravated battery. Id. at ¶ 4. Petitioner then failed to return for sentencing in the initial drug case and was subsequently arrested again. At sentencing, petitioner was sentenced to the maximum sentence of six years in prison. Id. at ¶ 5. Petitioner entered a negotiated plea to the charges of aggravated battery and unlawful possession of a weapon in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive 4 ½-year and 5-year sentences in prison. Id. at ¶ 6.

Shortly thereafter, Custer filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the drug case for failing to appeal or move to withdraw his guilty plea at his request. Id. at ¶ 7. The petition advanced to the second stage of proceedings, where post-conviction counsel was appointed. Post-conviction counsel filed a brief containing four affidavits from petitioner corroborating his claims via by stating that both he and his girlfriend had asked to appeal his conviction and sentence and withdraw his plea. The petition was advanced to the third stage of postconviction proceedings as a result, and a third-stage evidentiary hearing was scheduled. Prior to the hearing, Custer’s girlfriend sent a letter to the trial court (1) refuting petitioner’s innocence, (2) claiming she helped petitioner agree to plead guilty, (3) stating she’d been informed by trial counsel he was filing an appeal, and, (4) post-conviction counsel had refused to take her statement. Id. at ¶ 8.

At the hearing, Custer testified that trial counsel had advised him he’d likely be sentenced to “probation or three years in prison” if he pled guilty to the drug charge. Custer testified that after receiving a six-year sentence, he had requested trial counsel file an appeal. Petitioner further alleged that trial counsel had informed Custer a month following his request that he did not appeal the sentence because he found no viable appellate issues. Id. at ¶ 9. At the hearing, trial counsel denied ever being asked to appeal or withdraw his plea, stating he would have filed for both if petitioner had asked. Id. at ¶ 10. The court found the claims raised by petitioner to be “totally unbelievable” and “clearly contradicted by the facts and circumstances set forth in the record.” Id. at ¶ 12. The court found trial counsel to be “very believable.”

At the hearing on Custer’s motion to reconsider, the trial court immediately denied the motion after the State argued that the motion lacked any valid grounds for reconsideration. Id. at ¶ 14. Custer then filed a successive post-conviction petition, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his reconsideration request without first conducting a Krankel hearing. Despite the fact that Krankel has never been extended to post-conviction proceedings, the appellate court remanded the cause to the trial court for a “Krankel-like inquiry.” Id. at ¶ 15. The state filed a petition for leave to appeal that order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a), which was allowed.

The Supreme Court outlined the question before them as “whether the holding in Krankel, mandating a preliminary inquiry into the factual basis for a defendant’s pro se claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, should be extended to claims involving post-conviction counsel.” Id. at ¶ 17. The Court’s review was conducted de nov oand included evaluations of forfeiture and mootness claims brought by the petitioner, in addition the primary question regarding Krankel.

On the forfeiture issue, the Supreme Court decided to consider the mootness claim, because forfeiture applies exclusively to the parties, not the court. As such, the Court held that they may address the forfeited issues. Id. at ¶ 19. On the mootness issue, the Supreme Court agreed with Custer and rejected the State’s argument that the question was moot because petitioner had already received the requested relief. Id. at ¶ 21. The Court held that the “cursory hearing conducted by the trial court does not demonstrate that it adequately considered petitioner’s pro se claim of inadequate representation pursuant to Krankel.” Id. at ¶ 22.

On the substantive dispute on appeal, the applicability of Krankel to post-conviction counsel, the Court acknowledged that their opinion in Krankel has evolved to provide a means for defendants to assert post-trial claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. However, the Court noted that the petitioner’s claim pertained to post-conviction counsel, a new question for the Court.

The Court interpreted Custer’s “largely undefined” request as a question to “determine if conflict-free counsel needs to be appointed to represent [the petitioner] at the hearing on his motion to reconsider.” Id. at ¶ 28.  The Court noted that “criminal defendants seeking relief in postconviction proceedings have no constitutional right to counsel, effective or otherwise” and are entitled to only the “level of assistance guaranteed by the Act,” widely acknowledged to be a “reasonable level.” Id. at ¶ 30. The Court further noted that this standard is significantly lower than the one mandated at trial by the state and federal constitutions. The Court further pointed to Illinois Supreme Court Rules, such as Rule 651, which sharply limited the duties of post-conviction counsel. Id. at ¶ 32.

Despite the limited guarantees afforded to petitioners in post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner relied upon the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, which the court concluded “flatly fails to support petitioner’s contention that Krankel applies to pro se allegations of unreasonable assistance by postconviction counsel.” Id. at ¶ 33.

The Court also adopted the State’s argument that the extension of Krankel would magnify the potential for wasting limited judicial resources and multiply the already heavy strain Krankel places on our trial courts without any additional benefits. Id. at ¶ 35. The court found arguments made by the petitioner in response to this argument as unpersuasive because they had no measurable effect on the outcome of appeals. Id. at ¶ 39. The court concluded that “none of the benefits petitioner cites from extending Krankel to allegations that postconviction counsel provided inadequate assistance are as compelling as they were in their original posttrial context. Consequently, the analytical weight of those benefits in postconviction cases is lower than in our original Krankel calculus, while the weight of the adverse effects on available resources is necessarily higher.” Id. at ¶ 41.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Illinois declined Custer’s invitation to extend the post-trial motion procedures created in Krankel to allegations of unreasonable assistance by post-conviction counsel and remanded the cause to the appellate court for its initial consideration. Id. at ¶ 46.

Illinois Supreme Court says that State should not take on adversarial role during Krankel hearing (People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142)

People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142 (December 4, 2014). McLean Co. Appellate court reversed; circuit court reversed; remanded. Defendant John Willie Jolly was convicted at a jury trial of delivery of a controlled substance. He was sentenced as a Class X habitual offender to 16 years DOC. Jolly filed a pro se post-trial motion entitled “Motion to Reduce Sentence.” Jolly raised various ineffective assistance claims in the motion, in addition to challenging his sentence as excessive. The Public Defender’s office thereafter filed a letter with the court indicating that Jolly’s lawyer was no longer with the office, and that a new assistant public defender was reassigned to the case.

Jolly then filed a second pro se motion entitled “Motion to Amend the Motion to Reduce Sentence.” The pro se motion contained additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A hearing was held at which Jolly was represented by counsel from the Public Defender’s office. The Court denied the pro se motions, finding that the sentence was not excessive and that the ineffective assistance claims were untimely. The defendant appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case for a hearing on Jolly’s ineffective assistance claims pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984).

The Court then held a “Krankel hearing” on Jolly’s ineffective assistance claims. The Court excused Jolly’s new counsel from the courtroom during the hearing. Jolly thereafter proceeded pro se at the hearing. The Court allowed the defendant to state his claims, but he did not allow the defendant to argue the merits of the claims. The Court finished questioning the defendant about his claims and it asked the State whether they wanted to put on any evidence. The State was allowed to call defendant’s original trial counsel to testify, but the defendant was not allowed to cross-examine him. The defendant and the State were then permitted to argue about whether a full-blown evidentiary hearing on defendant’s ineffective assistance claims should be had.

“At the close of the hearing, the circuit court reemphasized the preliminary nature of the proceeding and explained that it was not intended to be a full evidentiary hearing. When describing how it reviewed defendant’s claims, the court stated that it considered the factual basis of the claims, the merit of the claims, whether the claims pertained to trial strategy, and whether they constituted ineffectiveness under the governing Strickland test. In addition, the court indicated that it would consider the statements of defendant and Welch, the court file, and its own observation of Welch’s performance during defendant’s trial. Last, and relevant to this appeal, the trial court also indicated that it would consider evidence not in the record. Specifically, the trial judge stated he would rely on his personal knowledge of Mr. Welch’s work as an attorney in prior unrelated criminal cases. The judge explained that he was familiar with Mr. Welch’s work “during that period of time that both of us were in the criminal felony division” and “would have had numerous encounters with one another.” The court then ruled that it would not appoint new counsel or proceed to a full evidentiary hearing because each of defendant’s allegations lacked merit or pertained to trial strategy.” ¶ 22. Jolly appealed, the appellate court affirmed, and the Ill. Supreme Court granted PLA.

Jolly argued on appeal that “the circuit court’s judgment must be reversed because the court failed to hold a proper preliminary Krankel hearing limited to investigating the factual basis for his claims and, instead, erroneously transformed the proceeding where he appeared pro se into an adversarial evidentiary hearing.” The State actually conceded this, but argued on appeal that the procedural error was harmless because the Court had effectuated the goal of the Krankel hearing by creating a sufficient record of defendant’s claims for appellate review.

The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the defendant, holding that “we believe that a preliminary Krankel inquiry should operate as a neutral and nonadversarial proceeding. Because a defendant is not appointed new counsel at the preliminary Krankel inquiry, it is critical that the State’s participation at that proceeding, if any, be de minimis. Certainly, the State should never be permitted to take an adversarial role against a pro se defendant at the preliminary Krankel inquiry.” ¶38. The Court reasoned that “Here, the circuit court permitted the State to question defendant and his trial counsel extensively in a manner contrary to defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and to solicit testimony from his trial counsel that rebutted defendant’s allegations. In other words, the circuit court allowed the State to confront and challenge defendant’s claims directly at a proceeding when defendant was not represented by counsel. The State also presented evidence and argument contrary to defendant’s claims and emphasized the experience of defendant’s trial counsel. Thus, as in Fields, the State and defendant’s trial counsel effectively argued against defendant at a proceeding when he appeared pro se. As we explained above, this is contrary to the intent of a preliminary Krankel inquiry.” ¶40.

The case was then reversed and remanded for a new preliminary Krankel inquiry without the State’s adversarial participation.