People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610 (December 31, 2014) (Court opinion corrected 2/3/15.) Cook Co., 5th Div. Affirmed. A jury found defendant Devin Reed guilty of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and residential burglary. Reed’s murder conviction and natural life sentence were affirmed on appeal, but his convictions and sentences for armed robbery and burglary were reversed. Reed then filed a pro se post-conviction petition, which was dismissed by the trial court at first-stage as being frivolous and patently without merit. This appeal followed.
Reed’s post-conviction petition claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress statements that Reed made to an ASA. Reed also asserted other garden variety claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Reed also claimed that the trial court erred by allowing the State to engage in various forms of misconduct. Reed claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective because, among other claims, appellate counsel failed to raise the ineffective assistance of trial counsel issues, the trial court’s errors, and the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct.
On appeal, “Reed first contends his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue the prosecutors and police failed to honor Reed’s requests to remain silent and for counsel, and interrogated him in violation of his fifth amendment rights. Reed also contends his appellate counsel was ineffective for arguing that, pursuant to Smith and People v. Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, the treatment of his general guilty verdict as a verdict of felony murder made him legally ineligible for a natural life sentence.” ¶ 41.
The State responded that “Reed’s petition not only fails to state the gist of these claims, but also fails to raise them at all, resulting in forfeiture of these claims on appeal.” ¶ 43. Section 725 ILCS 5/122-3 address the issue of waiver: “Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.”; People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (2006) (reiterating that a claim not raised in a postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). This court lacks the authority to excuse an appellate forfeiture caused by the failure of a litigant to include issues in his or her postconviction petition. See People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 507-08 (2004). “As our supreme court noted in Jones, attempts by counsel to raise claims for the first time on appeal from the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition are understandable, but simply not permitted under the Act.” ¶ 43.
Reed’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were argued on appeal for the first time, instead of being brought in his initial pro se petition. As our supreme court noted in Jones, attempts by counsel to raise claims for the first time on appeal from the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition are understandable, but simply not permitted under the Act: “[T]he typical pro se litigant will draft an inartful pleading which does not survive scrutiny under the ‘frivolity/patently without merit’ standard of section 122-2.1, and it is only during the appellate process, when the discerning eyes of an attorney are reviewing the record, that the more complex errors that a nonattorney cannot glean are discovered. The appellate attorney, not wishing to be remiss in his or her duty, then adds the newly discovered error to the appeal despite the fact that the claim was never considered by the trial court in the course of its ruling. *** [T]he attorney is zealously guarding the client’s rights and is attempting to conserve judicial resources by raising the claim expeditiously at the first available chance. These goals are laudable, but they nonetheless conflict with the nature of appellate review and the strictures of the Act.” Jones, 213 Ill. 2d at 504-05. ¶ 43.
Accordingly, the Reed court held that “Reed’s petition does not clearly set forth the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel now raised on appeal, resulting in forfeiture of these claims on appeal” for reasons stated above. The court then engaged in an alternative discussion of the merits of defendant’s claims, but the merits are purely academic at this point because the defendant’s claims are barred by waiver.
“In sum, the issues Reed’s counsel attempted to raise on appeal are forfeited because Reed failed to raise them in his postconviction petition. Even if Reed’s claims were not forfeited, they are frivolous and patently without merit, because Reed failed to attach supporting material and appellate counsel was not required to anticipate Bailey, which was decided after Reed’s direct appeals had concluded. In addition, Reed’s natural life sentence is not void because our supreme court’s decision in Bailey announced a new rule of constitutional procedure that does not apply retroactively to these postconviction proceedings. For all of the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.” ¶ 94.
This case underscores the importance of filing counseled post-conviction petitions. Not only does a counseled post-conviction petition automatically survive summary dismissal (where the trial court dismisses the petition without input from counsel, argument, further briefing, etc.), but it also provides the defendant with an opportunity to avoid forfeiture of important issues on appeal that pro se defendants typically cannot articulate, whether it is through a lack of skill and experience, a lack of resources and access to information, or both. Appellate lawyers—especially OSAD lawyers—are very, very adept at spotting and developing issues from the record, but as Reed shows, this exercise will be rendered largely academic if the defendant’s claims are not properly preserved and articulated at the trial court level, before it reaches the desk of the appellate practitioner.