An appellate court lacks the supervisory authority that would allow it to review an as-applied constitutional claim that was not raised in a post-conviction petition

The appellant in People v. Allen, 2019 IL App (1st) 162985, appealed the decision of the Circuit Court of Cook County denying leave to file his third successive pro se petition on the grounds that appellant’s mental illness renders him incapable of meeting the threshold burden of showing an arguably meritorious claim.

Appellant Allen was convicted of home invasion and the first-degree murder of his sister, Debbie Whitebear. Id. at ¶ 4. During appellant’s trial proceedings, Allen was diagnosed with a “psychotic delusional disorder.” Id. at ¶ 6. Appellant’s diagnosis, made following the examination and testimony (at a fitness hearing) of four psychologists and psychiatrists, stemmed from his theory of the case which stated that he had “killed his sister to protect their elderly mother from her abuse”; that his siblings had conspired to “hide from him the existence of a real estate trust which held the property of a man named Carl Lewis”, whom he believed was his real father; and, that Claude W. Allen Jr. his purported father, was a “serial killer.” Id. at ¶ 4. Appellant Allen also filed a pro se “Motion for Withdrawal of the Public Defender,” in which he argued that the public defender was “in direct collusion with the Assistant State’s Attorney.” Id. at ¶ 5. Appellant maintained these and other theories throughout pre-trial, trial and post-trial proceedings.

After appellant was restored to fitness and determined to be fit for trial, he filed a motion to proceed pro se and proceeded to represent himself in his trial in November 2007. Id. at ¶ 10. Ultimately, the “jury found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and home invasion.” Id. at ¶ 14. Following his conviction, appellant Allen filed a series of post-trial motions maintaining the aforementioned theories regarding his stolen inheritance, among other newly posited theories. The court denied the motions and sentenced him to “60 years’ imprisonment for the murder and a consecutive term of 25 years for home invasion.” Id. at ¶ 16.

On direct appeal, appellant argued that he was not mentally competent to represent himself pro se and that his waiver of trial counsel was invalid. The Appellate Court of Illinois First Judicial District affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Id. at ¶ 17. Following the appellate court’s ruling, appellant unsuccessfully petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to appeal, which was denied on September 29, 2010. The United States Supreme Court then subsequently denied appellant’s request for a writ of certiorari (Allen v. Illinois, 563 U.S. 1034 (2011)). Id. at ¶ 17.

Following two unsuccessful successive post-conviction petitions, on November 9, 2015, appellant filed a third successive post-conviction petition and a motion for expert assistance, which constitute the focus of the current appeal before the Appellate Court of Illinois First Judicial District. Id. at ¶ 23. The petition, which alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel in both of his previous post-conviction petitions, was denied by the court because “petitioner [Allen] had not established any prejudice from the alleged failures of his appellate counsel.” Id. at ¶ 26. On December 1, 2016, the court granted Allen leave to file a late notice of appeal from the circuit court’s order denying his motion for expert assistance and denying him leave to file his third successive petition. Id. at ¶ 26.

In the court’s analysis of the appeal, the primary issue of focus became whether appellant was so mentally ill that he was “incapable of advancing past the first stage of postconviction proceedings without the assistance of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 28. The court added that if appellant’s mental illness did in fact prevent him from proceeding without the assistance of counsel, they must determine the appropriate remedy.

The court analyzed the relative merit of appellant’s claims that his federal and/or state constitutional rights had been substantially violated via the procedural mechanism for such claims provided under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. As noted by the court, “[t]he Act allows inquiry into constitutional issues arising in the original proceeding which have not been raised and could not have been adjudicated on direct appeal. Therefore, issues that could have been raised on direct appeal are forfeited” and “any claim not presented in an original or amended petition is waived.” Id. at ¶ 29.

Of the three stages of proceedings under the Act, the first is especially pertinent to the court’s analysis because it is the stage that determines whether “the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit” and whether the petitioner is able to proceed to the second stage of proceedings, which would result in the appointment of counsel. Id. at ¶ 31.

The State Appellate Defender, on behalf of appellant, abandon’s all previous claims of error presented by appellant and did not present an argument that appellant stated a potentially meritorious claim in his most recent petition, as would have been required to proceed past the first stage of proceedings under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. Rather, the State Appellate Defender argued that “petitioner is so mentally ill that he is incapable of making a pro se showing of an arguably meritorious claim” and “because [he] does not acknowledge his illness and because he harbors prosecutory and paranoid delusions, he is incapable of raising any issues that are not “fantastic or delusional.” Id. at ¶ 33. As such, the State Appellate Defender argued that appellant is unable meet the threshold requirements to receive the appointed counsel that he “needs to present his potentially valid claims” and “is effectively denied meaningful access to the courts,” rendering the Act “unconstitutional as applied to him.” Id. at ¶ 33.

The relief requested by the State Appellate Defender was the reversal of the order denying petitioner’s leave to file his third successive post-conviction petition and the appointment of counsel to assess whether petitioner has any potentially meritorious claims. Id. at ¶ 36.

However, the court determined, regardless of fundamental fairness, it was unable to grant the requested relief because the “as-applied constitutional challenge has been waived” under the aforementioned guidelines of the Act. Id. at ¶ 37. Ultimately, the court held that unlike the Illinois Supreme Court, the appellate court lacks “the supervisory authority that would allow us to review an as-applied constitutional claim that was not actually raised in the petition.” Id. at ¶ 40.

Thus, because the as-applied constitutional challenge was not raised in the petition at the circuit court level, the court was compelled to find that it cannot be raised in this appeal and affirmed the judgement of the circuit court.

Court re-affirms that free-standing innocence claim cannot be brought after guilty plea

On May 8, 2019, the Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District, having previously denied appellant Demario D. Reed’s appeal of the Macon County Circuit Court’s decision to deny post-conviction relief in People v. Reed, 2019 IL App (4th) 170090, re-affirmed their judgment (originally filed on March 27, 2019) and denied a subsequent petition for re-hearing.

The court’s background and analysis in the modified opinion remains largely the same, yet the analysis section is augmented significantly by their revised consideration of the precedential value of People v. Shaw, 2018 IL App (1st) 152994.

Shaw was initially cited by appellant in his appellate brief for its determination that “a freestanding actual innocence claim may be brought [in a postconviction proceeding] after a guilty plea, and that a defendant need not challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his or her plea to bring such a claim.” Id. at ¶ 16. The Court originally “disagreed with Shaw’s holding that a postconviction claim of actual innocence may be brought after a valid guilty plea for three reasons.”

These three reasons were:

“First, the court believed the application of the Washingtontest inShawis like “trying to jam a square peg into a round hole” as (the supreme court dictates that) all postconviction claims of actual innocence must meet the Washingtonstandard and guilty-please are “inherentlyincapable of meeting the Washingtonstandard.” Id. at ¶ 36.

Second, the court held that “actual innocence would be a no jurisdictional defense to the charge and a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses or defects.” Id. at ¶ 37. The court concluded that “[i]f, by a postconviction claim of actual innocence, defendant now can obtain a trail, [the] admonition (of relinquished rights to a trial of any kind) would have been false.” Id. at ¶ 37.

Third, the court held that “defendants cannot knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty in the trial court and then turn around and complain to reviewing court that the trial court found them guilty” as that would be duplicitous. Id. at ¶ 38. Further, the court argued that even in the event that defendant’s conviction was a constitutional error, “it was an error he himself invited by pleading guilty” and “the use of invited error as a basis for postconviction relief is clearly frivolous and patently without merit.” Id. at ¶ 38. In support of this, the court cited People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004), which ruled “Defendant is estopped from “us[ing] the exact ruling or action [he] procured in the trial court as a vehicle for reversal on appeal.” Id.at ¶ 38.”

However, while the reasons cited by the court were sufficient to hold “because the validity of the guilty plea entered by defendant was not called into question upon appeal, that, de novo, appellant remains bound by his guilty plea and that “his claim of actual innocence cannot be entertained,” id. at ¶ 2,” they became inconsequential following the First District’s withdrawal of their opinion in Shaw, on March 19, 2019. Id. at ¶ 16. Following the First District’s withdrawn decision, the Court determined that “[a] withdrawn opinion lacks precedential value.” People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 205 (1984).” Id. at ¶ 16.

As a result of Shaw’s lack of precedential value, the Court turned to the only Illinois case which “has addressed the question of whether, in a postconviction proceeding, a defendant may raise a claim of actual innocence after being convicted on a valid, i.e., knowing and voluntary, guilty plea,”People v. Barnslater, 373 Ill. App. 3d 512 (2007). Id. at ¶ 17. Notably, the Court had initially looked to Barnslater (in the initial opinion) as more substantial precedent in the consideration of appellant’s grounds for appeal because it had cited Supreme Court precedent from People v. Cannon, 46 Ill. 2d 319, 321 (1970), noting, “when the supreme court speaks, our duty is to obey.” Id.at ¶ 19. Following the withdrawal of the First District’s decision in Shaw, Barnslater became the only precedent on the matter.

As such, the Court’s analysis remained largely the same. In the consideration of Barnslater, the court held that:

“only in the event of a coerced plea agreement would there be sufficient constitutional deprivation to justify postconviction relief,” and “not where he claims actual innocence in the face of a prior, constitutionally valid confession of guilt.” Id.at ¶ 17.

Despite acknowledging the cited passage from the ruling may have been obiter dictum (a “remark or expression of opinion that a court uttered as an aside, and is generally not binding authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule,”), because there was no Supreme Court precedent establishing that “a postconviction claim of actual innocence can be entertained after a guilty plea,” the Court held that “the obiter dictum of Cannon is still the law.” Id. at ¶ 21.

The remainder of the court’s analysis remained the same:

“the court used the Washington evidentiary standard set in People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996), that all evidence of actual innocence brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act must be “new, material, noncumulative[,] and, most importantly, of such a conclusive character as would probably change the result on retrial” in their evaluation of Reed’s claims of actual innocence. Id.at ¶ 23. As a result, the court held that in the event of a negotiated guilty plea, the defendant in that case would never be in a position for retrial as a voluntary guilty plea involves waving the rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the court held that because a guilty plea releases the State from their evidentiary burden, “[e]vidence, in general, would have been immaterial and superfluous.” Id.at ¶ 24.

Ultimately, the court held, because the validity of the guilty plea entered by defendant was not called into question upon appeal, that appellant remains bound by his guilty plea and that “his claim of actual innocence cannot be entertained.” Id.at ¶ 2. In support of this ruling, the court cited People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006) and People v. Cannon, 46 Ill. 2d 319, 321 (1970).

As a result, the Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District affirmed the ruling of Circuit Court of Macon County No. 14-CF-1205 and awarded the State $50 in costs against defendant.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In ground-breaking new decision, Illinois Supreme Court determines what constitutes a de facto life sentence for juveniles

In People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed, and ultimately affirmed, an appellate court’s decision to overturn the Cook County circuit court’s dismissal of a pro se post-conviction petition filed by the petitioner, Dimitri Buffer.

The petition asserted that a 50-year prison sentence for a crime committed by a 16-year-old was unconstitutional, as applied to the petitioner. The circuit court of Cook County initially dismissed the petition, yet their dismissal was promptly reversed by the appellate court, who held that the petitioner’s sentence was “imposed without consideration of his youth and its attendant characteristics” Id. at ¶ 1. Thus, the appellate court ruled that the sentence issued by the circuit court of Cook County constituted a violation of the petitioner’s eighth amendment rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The appellate court vacated the petitioner’s sentence and remanded the case to the circuit court for re-sentencing. Id. at ¶ 2. However, while the Supreme Court did affirm the judgement of the appellate court, the Court’s affirmation was made on different grounds than that of the appellate court. Id. at ¶ 3.

Prior to appeal, a jury found the defendant Buffer guilty of four counts of first degree murder, and specifically found that “defendant personally discharged a firearm that caused the victim’s death.” Id. at ¶ 5. In 2010, at the time of sentencing, Illinois law prescribed a sentencing range of 20 to 60 years for first degree murder and mandated a minimum 25-year additional prison term for personally discharging a firearm that “caused the victim’s death.” The Cook County circuit court merged the four first degree murder counts, sentencing defendant to 25 years for first degree murder with a 25-year mandatory firearm add-on, for an aggregate sentence of 50 years (followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release). Id. at ¶ 5.

At the time of defendant’s direct appeal, June 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that “imposing on a juvenile offender a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole, without consideration of the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics,” violated the eighth amendment. Id. at ¶ 6. Petitioner unsuccessfully filed a motion seeking leave to file a supplemental brief addressing the applicability of Miller to his sentence. However, the court denied defendant’s motion for leave and ultimately affirmed the Cook County circuit court conviction and sentence. People v. Buffer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102411-U, leave to appeal denied, No. 115148 (Ill. Jan. 30, 2013). Id. at ¶ 6.

Following aMarch 2014 opinion by the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, which held that Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review  (People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595), defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition in the circuit court, relying on Miller. The petition argued that petitioner’s 50-year sentence violated the eight amendment because it “constituted a de facto life sentence”. Id. at ¶ 7. The Cook County circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as “frivolous and patently without merit.” Id. at ¶ 7.

Defendant appealed from the Cook County circuit court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition on September 5, 2014. While the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion reached in Davis that Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). During that same period of time, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois also decided People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, extending Miller’s holding barring juveniles from mandatory natural life sentences to include mandatory de facto sentences. Id. at ¶ 8. The appellate court reversed the Cook County circuit court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition on the grounds that “(1) pursuant to Reyes, defendant’s 50-year sentence was a mandatory de facto life sentence and (2) the circuit court failed to consider defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing sentence.” Id. at ¶ 9. The court determined that Buffer’s sentence violated his eight amendment against cruel and unusual punishment and  vacated and remanded the case to the circuit court for re-sentencing under the juvenile sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)). The State appealed the appellate court’s decision to the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. at ¶ 10.

The Illinois Supreme Court evaluated the State’s appeal and the constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence in three distinct areas: the eighth amendment claim, the de facto life sentence issue, and the proper remedy. Id. at ¶ 11, ¶ 28, and ¶ 43.

As to Buffer’s eighth amendment claim, the court held that, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court view, Miller was a “substantive constitutional rule that applied retroactively.” Id. at ¶ 23. The Court also cited Montgomery as substantive reaffirmation of the holdings of Miller. The Court “concluded that Miller and Montgomery send an unequivocal message: Life sentences, whether mandatory or discretionary, for juvenile defendants are disproportionate and violate the eighth amendment, unless the trial court considers youth and its attendant characteristics.” Id. at ¶ 25. Six months later, the Court held once again, in Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, “that sentencing a juvenile offender to a mandatory term of years that is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.” Id. at ¶ 26. As a result, the Court held that in order to “prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.” Id. at ¶ 27.

As to de facto life sentences, the Court attempted to “to determine when a juvenile defendant’s prison term is long enough to be considered a de facto life sentence without parole.” Acknowledging, and ultimately rejecting, the wide range of opinions on the subject, the Court looked to the General Assembly for guidance as the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.” Id. at ¶ 34. In accordance with Miller, “the General Assembly has determined that the specified first-degree murders that would justify natural life imprisonment for adult offenders would warrant a mandatory minimum sentence of 40 years for juvenile offenders.” Id. at ¶ 39. As a result, the Court chose to “to draw a line at 40 years” for a de facto life sentence. Id. at ¶ 40. The Court thus stated, “because defendant’s sentence was greater than 40 years, we conclude that defendant received a de facto life sentence” and vacated the sentence as unconstitutional pursuant to Miller, Montgomery, Reyes and Holman. Id. at ¶ 42.

As to the remedy, the Court held that “Based on the particular issue raised in this appeal and in the interests of judicial economy, we agree with the appellate court that the proper remedy is to vacate defendant’s sentence and to remand for a new sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶ 47.

Buffer is likely to have a significant impact on the development of juvenile sentencing law in the state of Illinois. In fact, just today, the court vacated my client’s 45-year sentence vacated pursuant to Buffer after his successive post-conviction petition was granted.

Defendant cannot claim actual innocence on post-conviction without also challenging the validity of his guilty plea

The appellant in People v. Reed, 2019 IL App (4th) 170090 No. 4-17-0090 appealed the decision of the Macon County circuit court to deny post- conviction relief to defendant, Demario Reed.

Reed was serving a prison sentence of 15 years for armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-3(a) (West 2014)), when he filed a post-conviction petition, arguing that “newly discovered evidence he presented to the court in the postconviction hearing proved, clearly and convincingly, that he actually was innocent” of the charges for which pled guilty as part of a negotiated plea deal with the State. Id. at ¶ 1.

Prior to this appeal, Reed filed a successive post-conviction petition in which he claimed actual innocence of the count for which he had entered a negotiated guilty plea. He submitted “proof of his innocence, an affidavit by his codefendant, Davie Callaway,” and stated that Reed was unaware of the existence of the cocaine within Callaway’s possession, which a key piece of evidence in the charges against Reed. Id at ¶ 10. The petition advanced to third stage post-conviction proceedings after the State failed to dismiss the petition.

The circuit court denied Reed’s successive petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that the court “court simply did not believe Callaway”. Id at ¶ 13. In their opinion, the court wrote: “The court *** does not find that the testimony of Mr. Callaway to be credible as [he] did not come forward with this information until after he pled, and he and the petitioner were in prison together.” Id at ¶ 14. As a result, the court held that appellant did not have establish a colorable claim of actual innocence. This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellant cited People v. Shaw, 2018 IL App (1st) 152994, ¶ 41, a First District cased that held that “a freestanding actual innocence claim may be brought [in a postconviction proceeding] after a guilty plea, and that a defendant need not challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his or her plea to bring such a claim.” Id. at ¶ 16. Yet, upon the Court’s review, it uncovered that another division of the First District had reached the opposite conclusion, and cited Supreme Court precedent holding that only in the event of a coerced plea agreement would there be sufficient constitutional deprivation to justify post-conviction relief, and “not where he claims actual innocence in the face of a prior, constitutionally valid confession of guilt.” Id. at ¶ 17. The court found this precedent to be more substantial in the consideration of appellant’s grounds for appeal because “when the supreme court speaks, our duty is to obey.” Id. at ¶ 19. Moreover, the court was unaware of any other decision by the Supreme Court which stated that a post-conviction claim of actual innocence could be entertained after a valid plea of guilty.

Further, the court used the Washington evidentiary standard set forth in People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996) that all evidence of actual innocence brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act must be “new, material, noncumulative[,] and, most importantly, of such a conclusive character as would probably change the result on retrial” in their evaluation of Reed’s claims of actual innocence. Id. at ¶ 23. As a result, the court held that in the event of a negotiated guilty plea, the defendant in that case would never be in a position for re-trial, as a voluntary guilty plea involves waving the rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the court held that because a guilty plea releases the State from their evidentiary burden, “[e]vidence, in general, would have been immaterial and superfluous.” Id. at ¶ 24.

In the court’s consideration of appellant’s use of People v. Shaw, 2018 IL App (1st) 152994, the court disagreed with Shaw’s holding that a postconviction claim of actual innocence may be brought after a valid guilty plea for three reasons.

First, the court believed the application of the Washington test in Shaw is like “trying to jam a square peg into a round hole,” as the supreme court dictates that all post-conviction claims of actual innocence must meet the Washington standard and guilty pleas are “inherently incapable of meeting the Washington standard.” Id. at ¶ 36.

Second, the court held that “actual innocence would be a nonjurisdictional defense to the charge and a ‘guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses or defects.’” Id. at ¶ 37. The court concluded that “If, by a postconviction claim of actual innocence, defendant now can obtain a trial, that admonition would have been false.Id. at ¶ 37.

Third, the court held that “defendants cannot knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty in the trial court and then turn around and complain to a reviewing court that the trial court found them guilty,” as that would be duplicitous. Id. at ¶ 38. Further, the court argued that even in the event that defendant’s conviction was a constitutional error, “it was an error he himself invited by pleading guilty” and “the use of invited error as a basis for postconviction relief is clearly frivolous and patently without merit.” Id. at ¶ 38. In support of this, the court cited People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004), which ruled “Defendant is estopped from “us[ing] the exact ruling or action [he] procured in the trial court as a vehicle for reversal on appeal.” Id. at ¶ 38.

Ultimately, the court held, because the validity of the guilty plea entered by defendant was not called into question upon appeal, that, de novo, appellant remains bound by his guilty plea and that “his claim of actual innocence cannot be entertained.” Id. at ¶ 2. In support of this ruling, the court cited People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006) and  People v. Cannon, 46 Ill. 2d 319, 321 (1970). As a result, the Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District affirmed the ruling of Circuit Court of Macon County No. 14-CF-1205 and awarded the State $50 in costs against defendant.

A defendant’s motion for discovery filed after the court denied leave to file a successive petition is untimely

The petitioner in People v. Howery, 2018 IL App (3d) 160603 appealed the denial of his pro se motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition and motion for discovery.

While serving a life sentence for four counts of first-degree murder, four counts of felony murder, and one count of aggravated assault, petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentence in 2007 (People v. Howery, No. 3-05-0674) and 2011 (People v. Howery, 2011 IL App (3d) 090650-U). Following both appeals, petitioner filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, alleging that “new developments in the field of fire and arson forensic science constituted new evidence of his actual innocence.” Id. at ¶ 7. Petitioner argued these claims failed to materialize in previous postconviction petitions because the science did not exist at the time. Petitioner’s motion alleged that the expert witness testimony provided at his trial was “based on misleading and antiquated beliefs about fire and technology.” Id. at ¶ 7.

The circuit court found that petitioner’s pro se motion for leave and the successive post-conviction petition “failed to allege any prejudice” on behalf of the expert witness. Id. at ¶ 9. The court ultimately determined the aforementioned pleadings were nothing more than a “request for a court-ordered fishing expedition” and denied defendant leave to file his successive postconviction petition.

Petitioner then filed a subsequent motion to reconsider, alongside a free-standing motion for discovery; alleging that NFPA 921’s explanations of non-arson causes for multiple non-communicating fires can probably make sense of the two fires in the instant case, eliminating defendant as the arsonist, and proving defendant is an innocent man.” Id. at ¶ 10. Petitioner requested that the State produce a copy of NFPA 921. A key aspect of the testimony provided by the State’s expert witness on fire in petitioner’s initial trial pertained to the existence of two separate and unrelated fires in the home, which led the expert to opine that the fires were started deliberately. The court denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider and the free-standing motion for discovery on the grounds that petitioner failed to provide any legal authority to support the motion.

In its decision, the court evaluated each motion, for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition and for discovery, separately.

In order to obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, a petitioner must either establish cause and prejudice for failure to raise the claim earlier (People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002), or show actual innocence (People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010).

The court noted that petitioner’s entire argument was dependent upon NFPA 921; yet, the petitioner failed to include NFPA 921 in either the motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition or the proposed successive post-conviction petition itself. The court ruled because the “appellate court cannot consider evidence for the first time on appeal without it first being attached to defendant’s post-conviction petition for initial scrutiny and evaluation at the trial court level,” id. at ¶15, it was not properly before the court.

Thus, the court found petitioner was unable to present evidence of actual innocence and further, failed to identify the evidence that he believed was unreliable; how fire and arson forensic science had changed since his trial; how the new developments affected the fairness of the trial; or how these developments demonstrated his innocence. Had the petitioner and/or counsel adequately met the listed standards, the motion to file a successive postconviction petition would likely not have been denied. However, because the court held that petitioner failed to meet either standard required to obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the court did not err when it denied petitioner’s motion.

In the decision regarding the petition for free standing discovery, the court determined that “because defendant filed his motion for discovery after the circuit court denied defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition…the discovery request was untimely.” Id. at ¶18. Had the motion for discovery been filed prior to the denial of petitioner’s petition, the court would likely have ruled the motion timely.

Yet because the petition was ruled untimely, the court further determined the petition was procedurally improper, because a motion for discovery is neither a motion to reconsider or challenge the denial of an appeal, as stipulated by People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 451 (2005) following a denied petition. The court determined that “should defendant choose to file a new motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, he can incorporate NFPA 921 into his pleadings”, id. at ¶22, as petitioner’s appellate counsel is in possession of NFPA 921.

Ultimately, the judgement of the circuit court of Kankakee County was affirmed by the Third District Appellate Court of Illinois.